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p ERSONAL injury litigation continues to take an ever-increasing
share of the trial dockets in all parts of the country. As this trend
has grown the issue which has assumed more and more importance is
the amount of damages. The question of defendant's liability is not to
be minimized, but the great increase in the size of verdicts being ren-
dered is dramatic evidence of the time and attention being given to
this part of the case. The person who must usually be relied upon to
furnish testimony as to the character and extent of the plaintiff's in-
juries is a physician who has examined the plaintiff either for the pur-
pose of administering treatment or for the purpose of becoming an
expert medical witness in the case. If this issue is to be properly re-
solved in the vast number of cases, i.e., if the plaintiff is to receive
just compensation for his injuries and defendant is to pay no more
than this, there must be a closer cooperation between the members
of the medical and legal professions than exists at this time. Between
lawyers who represent plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury
actions on the one hand and doctors who are called upon to give
testimony in such cases on the other, there is often a lack of under-
standing as to the function and method of operation of the other
profession.' Doctors do not understand the adversary system, and
they are often embittered by their treatment on the witness stand at
the hands of lawyers and judges. Lawyers often do not appreciate the
t The substance of this paper was the basis of a lecture given at a Southwestern Legal
Foundation Institute on Personal Injury Litigation.
* A.B., Centre College; LL.B., University of Kentucky; S.J.D., University of Michigan;
Co-author, The Texas Law of Evidence, 1937 (with C. T. McCormick), 2d ed. 1956
(with W. F. Young); Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'Mettler, The Medical Source Book (1959). Dr. Mettler opens his preface with these
words: "Between physicians and scientists on the one hand and persons concerned with the
law on the other there exists a lack of understanding, a gap, recognized and acknowledged
on both sides, which is essentially one of purpose and thus involves a basic difference in
philosophy as well as in knowledge and method." This new book was written for the pur-
pose of helping lawyers in their dealings with medical matters involved in personal injury
cases. Dr. Mettler is Professor of Anatomy at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Co-
lumbia University.
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fact that a good doctor will invariably subordinate all other consi-
derations to that of the welfare of his patient." They are also impa-
tient with the reluctance of many competent physicians to testify in
personal injury cases, and of others to give precise statements as to
the nature, cause, and extent of plaintiff's injuries.
It is the writer's belief that a large part of the resentment on the
part of doctors is due to the restrictions which the courts have placed
upon their attempts to give the jury the benefit of their observations
and opinions. A primary purpose of this paper will be to point out
some of the restrictions which I consider both unreasonable and un-
necessary. To accomplish this it will be convenient to consider the
physician's testimony in three separate categories: (1) testimony of
the doctor as to statements of the patient concerning his present and
past symptoms, where these statements are offered as evidence of
their truth; (2) the doctor's opinion as to the character and extent
of plaintiff's injuries, including his pain and suffering; and (3) the
doctor's recital of the data upon which he bases his opinion. The
frequent failure of courts to differentiate between these three types
of evidence has led to confusion in decisions.
I. STATEMENTS OF PLAINTIFF AS TO SYMPTOMS
A. Made to a Doctor Consulted for Treatment
First to be considered is the admissibility of statements of the
patient about his condition, made to a physician whom he is consult-
ing for treatment. These may relate to present condition or to past
symptoms. Whenever such declarations are used to prove the truth of
the facts asserted they are within the prohibition of the hearsay rule
and must qualify under some recognized exception to the hearsay
rule in order to gain admission. For example, if the victim of an
automobile collision says to the doctor, "my back aches," and the
doctor testifies to this statement for the purpose of proving that the
speaker actually did have a backache, this is clearly hearsay. How-
ever, it comes into evidence under the well-recognized exception to
the hearsay rule for statements as to bodily condition. From such
statements evidence of conduct other than statements, as well as state-
ments which are not assertive, must be distinguished. Illustrations of
these are inarticulate cries, screams, groans, facial contortions, and
like indications of pain or bodily conditions. These are not hearsay at
all, and come in simply as circumstantial evidence of the bodily states
'Mettler, op. cit. supra note 1, at vii.
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indicated, assuming, of course, that they are relevant.3 The same is
true of any statement from which a bodily condition may be inferred
(other than a direct assertion of its existence) as, for example, a re-
quest for aspirin, which would indicate a headache.
Today practically all courts receive statements as to present pain
and bodily conditions made to a doctor consulted for the purpose
of treatment. It should be noted, however, that language is to be
found in some opinions which would restrict such statements to those
made involuntarily in the sense that they were made without reflec-
tion and under pressure of pain.4 This is believed to be too restrictive,
since in the very nature of things most of the statements are made
with more or less reflection and in answer to questions asked by the
physician. In these situations it is the prompting of the bodily con-
dition, and not the excitement from any startling event, which is
important. Despite the restrictive language used by some courts, there
are statements in several Texas cases indicating that the courts will
admit any expression of present bodily sensations, though not invol-
untary, if made under circumstances which show that the patient
was not consciously trying to create evidence for himself.! However,
in admitting such declarations the courts frequently have used the
res gestae phrase, which unfortunately tends to associate this excep-
tion with that for spontaneous exclamations. For example, one Texas
court used these words: "The evidence was not shown to be admissible
as 'Res Gestae' of the original injury, but such declarations of pain
and suffering and their locality were admissible as 'Res Gestae' of the
pain and suffering of Adcock at the time they were made."' As a
matter of fact, the use of res gestae in this connection means nothing
more than a statement of present condition made under unsuspicious
circumstances.7 Parenthetically it might be mentioned that in most
jurisdictions complaints of present pain may be testified to by any
witness who heard them.'
'United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Nettles, 21 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929),
rev'd on other grounds, 35 S.W.2d 1045 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931) (witness
testified that he often heard moans and groans from appellee's room, which was just across
from his room). See also Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940); Inter-
national & G.N.R. Co. v. Cain, 80 S.W. 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (witness testified
that plaintiff made a great deal of fuss in his sleep, groaning and rolling).
4 Wheeler v. Tyler S.E. Ry., 91 Tex. 356, 43 S.W. 876 (1898); Texas State Fair v.
Marti, 69 S.W. 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
'Rogers v. Crain, 30 Tex. 284 (1867); Houston & T.C.R.R. v. Shafer, 54 Tex. 641,
648 (1881); McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 838 (2d ed. 1956). A recent
Missouri case is State v. Hacker, - Mo. - 291 S.W.2d 155, 160 (1956).
'Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Adcock, 244 S.W. 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
'Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Flint, 14 S.W.2d 1046 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)
error ref.
'Wigmore, Evidence § 1719 (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 557 (1929); McCor-
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Statements of past symptoms, past pain and suffering, even though
made to a physician consulted for treatment, are rejected by most
courts when offered as evidence of their truth.' Expressions to this
effect are found in several Texas civil appeals cases.1" It is believed
that this position is unsound. The reason usually given is that these
statements lack trustworthiness, since they are merely reflective of
past occurrences and are not evoked by present pain. Where such
statements are made to a physician upon whom the declarant is
calling for treatment which he knows will be based in considerable
degree upon the statements, there is a very practical motive for tell-
ing the truth, namely, the desire for correct treatment. This reason,
which seems to have been overlooked by many courts, affords ample
justification for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of
statements as to past condition made to a treating doctor. One of
the leading opinions espousing this view was written by Judge Lear-
ned Hand of the Second Circuit in Meaney v. United States"5 which
involved an action on a policy of war risk insurance. The insured
was mustered out in December, 1918, and the policy lapsed one
month later. More than two years later he died of pulmonary
tuberculosis. He had consulted one physician in 1919 and one in
1920 and they found that he had contracted tuberculosis and that it
was already "moderately advanced." The government won in the
district court and the only error considered on appeal involved a
ruling made during the testimony of the physician who had examined
him in 1920. The doctor said that he had been the assured's physician
from the 1920 examination until death, except for a few months
when the patient was in a sanatorium. The trial judge allowed the
doctor to state the findings of his several examinations but refused
to let him state what the assured had told him about the "history of
the case." Since the first physician who had examined the assured
was dead, the declarations which assured had made to the witness
with respect to the time of the onset of the disease and its immediate
severity were likely to determine the issue. Judge Hand said:
The insured's declarations seem to have been offered as a narrative of
his past condition; so far as appears they were no part of the basis of
the physician's opinion as to his condition; at least they were not offer-
mick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 5, S 841.
'Collections of cases are found in Annot., 67 A.L.R. 22 (1930); Annot., 80 A.L.R.
1529 (1932); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 982 (1941). Recent cases from other states are: Cain
v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P.2d 909 (1953) and Jones v. Terminal R.R., 246 S.W.2d
356 (Mo. App. 1952).
10Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Krueger, 239 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); South-
western Greyhound Lines v. Dickson, 219 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
11 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940).
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ed as such. They were therefore hearsay, and moreover, they did not
fall within the generally accepted exception in favor of spontaneous
expressions of pain or the like .... The utterances of a patient in the
course of his examination, so far as they are spontaneous, may be merely
ejaculatory-as when he emits a cry upon palpation---or they may be
truly narrative; it will often be impossible to distinguish rationally
between the two; between an inarticulate cry, for example, and a
statement such as: "That hurts". The warrant for the admission of both
is the same; the lack of opportunity or motive for fabrication upon
an unexpected occasion to which the declarant responds immediately,
and without reflection. But most of what he tells will not ordinarily be
of this kind at all; there may be and there is in fact good reason to
receive it, but it is a very different reason. A man goes to his physician
expecting to recount all that he feels, and often he has with some care
searched his consciousness to be sure that he will leave out nothing. If
his narrative of present symptoms is to be received as evidence of the
facts, as distinguished from mere support for the physician's opinion,
these parts of it can only rest upon his motive to disclose the truth
because his treatment will in part depend upon what he says. . . The
same reasoning applies with exactly the same force to a narrative of
past symptoms. . . . A patient has an equal motive to speak truth;
what he has felt in the past is as apt to be important in his treatment
as what he feels at the moment." It appears to us that if there is to be
any consistency in doctrine, either declarations of all symptoms, present
or past, should be competent, or only those which would fall within the
exception for spontaneous utterances. Nobody would choose the second
particularly as the substance of the declarations can usually be got be-
fore the jury as parts of the basis on which the physician's opinion was
formed. . . . We hold that the insured's history of the case as narrated
to the physician was competent and that its exclusion was error."
A holding to the same effect is found in a workmen's compensa-
tion case from Pennsylvania, where the doctor who first saw the
injured person thirteen months after the accident was allowed to
testify at length as to the history of the case given to him by the
patient-plaintiff. There are several earlier Texas decisions in accord."
In Walker v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co.,'" where the patient became
violently ill, his statement concerning what he had eaten for dinner
was held admissible. But it seems doubtful that the Texas Supreme
Court meant to hold that the declaration was receivable as indepen-
dent evidence as distinguished from a basis for the doctor's opinion.
In a more recent Texas civil appeals case, a doctor was allowed to
"2 All physicians, in making a final diagnosis, place great value on the past medical his-
tory of a patient. I am advised by internal medicine specialists that in many cases it would
be impossible to make an accurate diagnosis without a complete past history.
13112 F.2d 538, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1940).
'"Gallihue v. Autocar Co., 169 Pa. Super. 303, 82 A.2d 73 (1951).
"McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 5, § 842 n.59; Rogers v. Crain, 30 Tex.
284 (1867); Kennedy v. Upshaw, 66 Tex. 442 (1886).
" 13 1 Tex. 57, 112 S.W.2d 170 (1938).
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relate the history of a patient's suffering as given to him by the pa-
tient, but the testimony presumably was admitted only to show the
basis of his opinion." It is interesting to note that some of the courts
which purportedly exclude statements as to past symptoms evince a
tendency to relax the rule on occasion. They will be found classify-
ing as declarations of present symptoms descriptions which really in-
clude the past. For example, a physician's testimony that "he came
to my office and told me that his sputum was stained with blood"
was held admissible by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit."8 And in a Missouri case the patient's statement to his
doctor, during treatment, that he had been unable to hold food on
his stomach, was admitted."9
The courts have almost uniformly rejected testimony of doctors as
to statements describing external events such as the accident which
allegedly caused the injury to the declarant, where these statements
are offered as evidence of their truth."0 This is difficult for doctors to
understand. It would seem that when such statements are made to a
doctor who is consulted for diagnosis and treatment, the declarant's
motive in describing the accident correctly for the physician's in-
formation is about as strong as in the case of past pain and symptoms.
And furthermore, the dividing line between descriptions of external
cause and of bodily effect is in practice frequently difficult to draw.
Nevertheless, most courts, including those of Texas, refuse to relax
the rule.' Some authority to the contrary is found in other states."'
" Ynsfran v. Burkhart, 247 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
"SHartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Baugh, 87 F.2d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 679 (1937). The physician actually testified: "In the latter part of
January he (Baugh) spit up a little blood. He came to my office and told me that his
sputum was stained with blood. I though that sputum came from his lungs." The majority
opinion stated that the statement related, not to a past, but to a present symptom, then
existing. But as the dissenting judge points out, the doctor neither saw the patient spit blood
nor saw the blood-stained sputum. It seems clear that the patient's statement referred to
what had happened prior to the time he came to see the doctor.
'
5 McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co., 112 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. App. 1938).
2 Texas cases to this effect are numerous. A collection will be found in McCormick &
Ray, op. cit. supra note 5, § 843 nn.59 & 60.
"5 Newman v. Dodson, 61 Tex. 91, 95 (1884) (statement of plaintiff to physician as
to how wound was received, held hearsay and inadmissible); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Morgan, 187 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.o.m.
2 Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 137 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1943) (action for death of
a railway hostler, allegedly due to exertion while throwing a switch; decedent's declarations
to a doctor as to the nature and extent of his exertions held admissible, but his statement
that the switch was out of order excluded); Hillman v. Utah Power & Light Co., 56
Idaho 67, 51 P.2d 703 (1935) (workmen's compensation; statement to doctor as to how
accident occurred, by hitting head on regulator panel, admitted); Valentine v. Weaver,
191 Ky. 37, 228 S.W. 1036 (1921) (workmen's compensation; declaration of deceased that
he stuck splinter in his hand, and time when, held admissible. However, the court excluded
statement as to place where this occurred. This discrimination is too subtle for the present
writer); Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 (1933) (declaration
while seeking treatment for strangulated hernia, that condition was caused by fall, held
competent in workmen's compensation proceeding).
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Although rejected as evidence of their truth, such statements made
by a patient to a physician regarding events causing the injury may
be related by the physician in explanation of his expert opinion as
to the cause, nature, and duration of the injury." Declarations as to
external events may also qualify for admission as a spontaneous state-
ment made under excitement," or in rebuttal of a claim of admission
by silence.2"
B. Made to a Doctor Who Examines for the Purpose
of Becoming a Witness
In some of the exceptions to the hearsay rule there is a hard and
fast limitation that the declaration must have been made ante litem
motam, that is, before the controversy about the subject matter arose.
No such limitation is imposed on statements as to bodily condition,
and usually the claim follows the injury so closely that such a rule
would not be proper. However, in one instance a very rigid rule has
been adopted in many jurisdictions. It is to the effect that state-
ments to a physician who examines the litigant for the sole purpose
of qualifying to testify as an expert witness are not admissible as
independent testimony, i.e., to prove the truth of the facts stated to
the doctor." The reason, of course, is that these declarations are sus-
pect as evidence making. As one judge put it, "self interest becomes
a motive for distortion, exaggeration and falsehood." In Texas this
rule has been followed in numerous civil appeals decisions. 7 In one
case, for example, the plaintiff went to a doctor for examination
about a year after the accident solely for the purpose of enabling him
to qualify as an expert medical witness in plaintiff's behalf. The
doctor was not permitted to testify that the plaintiff had complained
to him about suffering with his knees and legs."8 Although the
Supreme Court of Texas has never expressly decided the question,"
it has in dictum indicated its approval of the rule." However, even
2 Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wilkerson, 199 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)
error ref. n.r.e.
24 McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 5, S 919.
"Hines v. Blackman, 226 S.W. 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), aff'd, 239 S.W. 908 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1922).
2 McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 5, S 839 nn. 33 & 34. Collections of cases
are found in 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 826 (1908); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 15 (1930); Annot., 80
A.L.R. 1528 (1932); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 978 (1941).
27 See cases cited in McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 5, § 838.
2Gaines v. Stewart, 57 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). See also Federal Under-
writers Exch. v. Arnold, 127 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism. jud. corr.;
United Employers' Cas. Co. v. Marr, 144 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism.
jud. corr.
2' The question has been argued before the court.
"
0 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 409, 67 S.W. 768 (1902).
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under this rule testimony as to inarticulate groans, screams, and the
like, produced by present pain may be received, though they occurred
during examination by a doctor called in for the sole purpose of qual-
ifying as a future witness. And on occasion the courts seem to stretch
a point in calling statements spontaneous indications of present pain
in order to bring them into evidence without admitting any relaxa-
tion of the usual rule. For example, in a Texas case"' the plaintiff was
unloading mail from a car on a siding when another car bumped into
it, knocking him to the ground. Defendant objected to the admission
of statements of plaintiff concerning his physical condition made to
a doctor to whom he went for the purpose of making him a witness
in his behalf. The doctor's testimony was that plaintiff complained of
dizziness when standing with his eyes closed, pain in muscles around
his shoulders, spine, and back, and of popping in his ears at times.
This was held to be admissible under the rule stated by the supreme
court in the earlier case of Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Johnson,"3 ad-
mitting "spontaneous indications of pain" during an examination.
Normally, however, evidence of statements as to past pain, external
events, and seemingly even declarations of present pain will not be re-
ceived as independent evidence under such circumstances unless they
amount to involuntary reactions. The New Jersey Supreme Court ex-
cluded even a statement by the plaintiff of a present "ringing in the
ears." It should be noted that the rule of exclusion just discussed does
not apply where the physician is called for preparation as a witness
and for treatment."4 It is now a rather common practice for personal
injury plaintiffs, seeking to avoid the rule of exclusion, to call the
doctor for both purposes and to have him actually prescribe for the
patient. In such case it is not necessary that treatment actually be
administered in order for the statement to be received.3"
II. OPINION OF PHYSICIAN BASED ON STATEMENTS
OF PATIENT OR OTHER PERSONS
Where the doctor speaks from personal knowledge or observa-
tion, as, for example, where he has examined and treated a patient,
he may express his opinion of the patient's physical condition, in-
cluding the nature, cause, and extent of his injuries. But suppose
31Missouri Pat. Ry. v. Baldwin, 273 S.W. 834 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
3295 Tex. 409, 67 S.W. 768 (1902).
3 3Hutchison v. Jersey Cent. Traction Co., 1 N.J. Misc. 278, 126 Atl. 482 (1923).
4 E1 Paso & S. W. Ry. v. Polk, 108 S.W. 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) error ref.;
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Morgan, 187 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
w.o.m.




his knowledge has been obtained in part from the statements or re-
ports of third persons other than the patient. Does this prevent the
use of the medical expert's opinion? The usual holding is that it
does."8 This means that opinions of physicians based upon reports
of examination by other doctors or upon hospital records disclosing
the patient's symptoms and treatment are rejected. The writer re-
gards this as a most unsound rule because such records normally
have a very high degree of reliability and physicians themselves
place great reliance upon them in making their own diagnosis and
determining a course of treatment. One qualification of the rule
was made by the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals in a suit on an
accident policy for a child's death." Without taking into consideration
any history of the case, and basing his opinion solely on his examina-
tion of the child, the doctor testified that death could have been due
to respiratory congestion as well as to accidental suffocation. But
taking into consideration the history given him by the parents, he
was of the opinion that death was caused by accidental suffocation.
The court said the general rule of exclusion did not apply where
statements as to history were shown to be true. And in this case there
had been no dispute as to the facts surrounding the death when a
former settlement had been made. Therefore, the court said, the
doctor's opinion was admissible. Where information is supplied to
the doctor by lay persons entirely outside the family circle his opinion
based thereon would have little to recommend it. It may well be
argued, however, that where the doctor has been given the history
of the patient by a spouse or parent who had personal observation,
his opinion based in some part thereon is entitled to consideration
by the fact finder. Scattered cases approving the reception of the
opinion in this situation may be found in other states." In a Mary-
land case" involving a claim for injuries to a three-year-old child,
the court admitted the opinion of an attending physician, which
was based in part upon information received from the child's mother.
The majority of courts categorically reject such opinions.' An illus-
"'Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Everett, 275 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.
n.r.e. (opinion based in part on medical histories compiled by other doctors excluded);
Republic Underwriters v. Lewis, 106 S.W.2d 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Fidelity Union
Cas. Co. v. Dapperman, 47 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error dism.
"National Security Life & Cas. Co. v. Benham, 233 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
error ref. n.r.e.
"'Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 232 Ala. 378, 168 So. 181 (1936); Welter v.
Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Osborne, 286 Ky. 301, 150 S.W.2d 479 (1941); Marshall v. Sellers, 188 Md. 508, 53
A.2d 5 (1947); Leora v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. Marie Ry., 156 Wis. 386, 146 N.W.
520 (1914).
"Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md. 546, 39 A.2d 546 (1944).
" For a collection of cases from many jurisdictions see Annot., 175 A.L.R. 274 (1948).
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tration of the extent to which the courts will go is furnished by a
federal court of appeals case from the Fifth Circuit. 1 Part of the evi-
dence introduced by plaintiff was to the effect that deceased told his
wife he had seen dark blood in his stool. All of plaintiff's evidence was
put in a hypothetical question which was propounded to the doctor.
The court held that deceased's statement to his wife should have
been excluded as hearsay, and that the doctor's opinion based in part
on the statement was also inadmissible. The wife was present at the
trial, testified as to the statement and was cross-examined about it.
Of course, it is difficult to tell to what extent the opinion was based
on the statement, but it was included in the hypothetical question.
The court reversed for this error, citing and relying on several Texas
cases.
When the report upon which the physician partly bases his opinion
comes from an attending doctor or nurse who had personal obser-
vation and an interest in learning and describing accurately, there is
good reason for receiving the opinion. This was the position taken
by the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in a recent case, John F.
Buckner & Sons v. Allen." In that case Dr. Mee, a kidney and
bladder specialist, had been called in to diagnose and treat the plain-
tiff. He saw and treated her three times over the period of a month.
He testified that he looked at the bedside chart and went over the
whole case with Dr. Swann, the attending physician, including plain-
tiff's injuries, to determine the possibility of kidney injuries. He was
then asked: "As a result of that did you find out for yourself
whether or not there had been any trauma or injury to any area
of the body that might have some effect on the kidney or bladder
or any part of the urinary tract?" 3 This was permitted over objec-
tion that the question called for an answer based on hearsay and
not on personal knowledge. In affirming, the court of civil appeals
said: "Dr. Mee was simply getting the history of appellee's complaint
of kidney ailment for the purpose of enabling him to diagnose the
complaint and to form an opinion for treatment and not to give
independent evidence."" Every physician relies upon this kind of
information in making a diagnosis and forming an opinion. It is
well known that medical men base their opinions on many sources
of information in addition to their objective findings. These include
their medical studies, experience in other cases, medical treatises,
scientific articles and results of research appearing in medical jour-
41 Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Terrell, 180 F.2d 1 (Sth Cir. 1950).
42 289 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
43 Id. at 394.44 Id. at 395.
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nals, and reports of doctors and nurses, as well as statements of the
patient. It is not feasible to determine the part each plays in the
formation of the physician's opinion. But since these sources are
accepted by the doctor as the basis for judgment upon which he
acts in practicing his profession it would seem that they should be
regarded by the courts as sufficiently reliable to justify the admis-
sion of the doctor's opinion for evaluation by the trier of the facts.
In this connection it is interesting to note the treatment of a similar
question by the El Paso Court of Civil Apeals in a case involving
the opinion of a geologist."5 His opinion of the value of oil prospects
was received though admittedly based in large part upon the report
of other geologists. The court said: "The conclusions of an expert
as to so technical a subject . . . arrived at in part from study of
unsworn reports prepared by other experts are analogous to the
diagnosis by a physician based in part on unsworn reports of tests
made by hospital technicians. Testimony of diagnoses based in part
on such reports has been held to be admissible."4
The situation most frequently arising in litigation is that of a
physician who seeks to give an opinion based in part on the patient's
statements of past symptoms. Where the statements are made to
the doctor being consulted for the purpose of treatment, the Texas
courts receive the opinion." And the fact that the doctor did not
actually treat the patient has been held not to affect the admissibility
of the opinion." One of the best statements on the subject is found
in Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. McNeill,49 where the court said:
The appellant . .. complains that the expert medical evidence of
Dr. McGrath on behalf of the appellee was insufficient to support thejury's verdict of temporary total disability resulting from the appellee's
accidental injury. The gist of... [appellant's argument] is that Dr. Mc-
Grath testified that he examined the appellee and found two, possibly
three fractured ribs, that the ribs had not healed at the time of the
trial and that from the history of the accident given to him by McNeill
it was his opinion that McNeill's condition resulted from his accidental
injury in the mill, that he was totally and permanently disabled and
that his condition was the result of such accidental injury; that since
the doctor's opinion was based partly on the history of the case given
to him by the appellee it is hearsay and not sufficient to prove the cause
4 Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.
46 Id. at 670.
" Advance Loan Serv. v. Mandik, 306 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Texas Gen.
Indem. Co. v. McNeill, 261 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Federal Underwriters
Exch. v. Carroll, 130 S.W.2d 1101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
48Austin Road Co. v. Thompson, 275 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.
n.r.e.
44261 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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of the injury. A number of cases are cited and quoted from by the
appellant in his brief to substantiate this argument. We believe, however,
that they are not in point and that appellant has overlooked the testi-
mony that appellee visited the doctor for the purpose of receiving treat-
ment, that the doctor examined him physically and also inquired of him
as to the history of the case, all for the purpose of treating him, and
thereafter did treat him. This state of facts takes the testimony of the
doctor out of the category of hearsay testimony. We believe the rule is
well established . . . that the opinion of a physician or surgeon as to the
condition of an injured or diseased person is not rendered incompetent
by the fact that it is based upon the history of the case given by the
patient to the physician or surgeon on his examination of the patient,
where the examination was made for the purposes of treatment and
cure of the patient."
The court held that Dr. McGrath's testimony was properly received.
Where the doctor examines an injured claimant solely for the
purpose of qualifying himself to testify in court as an expert witness,
his opinion based in any part upon the statements of the patient
as to subjective symptoms is rejected.5 In effect the courts have
made the admissibility of the opinion depend upon the admissibility
of the statements of the patient upon which it is partly based. This
appears to be an unfair limitation on a reasonable practice of per-
sonal injury claimants in preparing their cases for trial, namely,
that of securing eminent physicians to make an examination for
the purpose of later aiding the court and jury in understanding
the claimant's physical condition. Of course, the obvious motive for
such limitation is the court's fear of dishonesty. But honest experts,
whether employed by plaintiff, defendant, or the court, constitute
one of the most reliable sources for discovery of truth, frequently
superior to that of the treating or family doctor, who often makes
a very poor witness. That such medical experts of wide reputation
may be more effective as witnesses than differently qualified doctors
would seem to furnish no sound reason for excluding their evidence.
In short, the restriction is believed undesirable, and its enforcement
will merely cause plaintiff's counsel to seek means of circumventing
it. This may be accomplished by having the doctor selected as the
expert witness examine for prospective treatment and actually pre-
scribe such, or by having the claimant testify as to his symptoms
and then put this testimony in the form of a hypothetical question
'Id. at 383.
"Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McMullin, 279 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)
error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wells, 207 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947) error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Morgan, 187 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ.




for the doctor. A wise treatment of this problem is found in the
opinion of an Oregon judge in which he argued for admissibility
of both statements and opinion. 2 He said in part:
To me it seems that the authorities, which exclude the medical ex-
pert's opinion, lay undue emphasis upon the communications of the
declarant; it is not the latter, but the physician's opinion which becomes
the evidence. The opinion is not founded exclusively upon the narrative
but upon the combined effects of that with his observation of the con-
sultant, his schooling, experience and knowledge of similar cases. Ex-
perts are oft'times permitted to employ as a part of the material upon
which they found an opinion, information which is ordinarily denomi-
nated as hearsay. . . . I believe that the objection to the opinion of the
expert, based in part upon the history of the case, is applicable to its
weight and not to admissibility. One who in good faith seeks the services
of a medical expert as a witness would find it as impossible to com-
municate the facts of an internal disorder as another who seeks treat-
ment. In these days when a tortious party frequently takes charge at
once of supplying the injured one with medical treatment, a rigid ap-
plication of the suggested rule might drive a plaintiff to the ranks of
his adversaries' employees in order to prove an important feature of his
case. Next, it seems to me that the skirmishes back and forth to ex-
clude or admit such testimony are largely in the nature of sham battles,
for, if the testimony should be excluded by the application of the rule
suggested by the defendant, it would promptly make its appearance in
the form of a hypothetical question accompanied by the physician's
opinion-answer.5
Since the courts are really concerned with fairness it would be well
for the trial judge to have the discretion to exclude such opinions
when offered by a claimant who has refused to permit a similar
examination by reputable physicians selected by the defendant.
It is interesting to note that in a number of states where the rule
excluding the doctor's opinion is purportedly accepted, the courts
place various limitations upon its operation. In a relatively recent
Texas case, the doctor testified that the only statement made by the
plaintiff on which he relied was as to the part of the body he ex-
amined. The court held that the doctor's testimony was based on
his objective findings. 4 In Minnesota the courts admit the doctor's
opinion when it is based on hypothetical questions embodying all
symptomatic facts of which there is evidence.5 The Supreme Court
of Tennessee, after stating the general rule, refused to reverse be-
52 Justice Rossman specially concurring in Reid v. Yellow Cab Co., 131 Ore. 27, 279
Pac. 635, 640 (1929).
"' 279 Pac. at 640.
"'Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McMullin, 279 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)
error ref. n.r.e.
" Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433 (1950).
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cause the doctor based his opinion in part on what plaintiff told him
when the doctor made his own examination."s In Missouri a doctor
who examines for the purpose of qualifying as a witness may give
an opinion based on a statement as to present symptoms, but not
as to past symptoms.57 Oklahoma apparently rejects the rule entirely,
and permits the use of the opinion and the facts as to past history
as the basis of the opinion. 8
III. DOCTOR'S RECITAL OF STATEMENTS
ON WHICH HE BASES HIS OPINION
The general rule is that an expert who has given an opinion may
either on direct or cross-examination, relate an account of the basis
upon which his opinion is founded.59 If this testimony is competent
as independent evidence upon the issues in the case, it is admissible
in that role. Even if not admissible as independent evidence, it is
normally admissible to explain the basis for the opinion previously
expressed, thus enabling the jury to test the value of the opinion.
Hence, where a doctor who has been consulted by a patient for the
purposes of diagnosis and treatment testifies as an expert witness
with reference to the nature and extent of the patient's injuries,
his recital of the patient's statements upon which his opinion has
been partly founded is admissible." In Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
Smith,6' the Supreme Court of Texas said:
We find no error in the action of the court in permitting the physician
who attended Mrs. Smith during her illness to state what she told him
while he was treating her, about her exposure at the place where she
left the train, in connection with his own opinion as to the cause of
her sickness. The statement was made as the basis for the doctor's
opinion, and not as independent evidence to establish the fact of ex-
posure.6
"aGulch Lumber Co. v. Fields, 193 Tenn. 365, 246 S.W.2d 47 (1952). A similar rul-
ing by a federal court is Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Williams, 198 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1952).
" Murphy v. S. S. Kresge Co., 239 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. App. 1951), reviewing the Missouri
cases; Holmes v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 363 Mo. 1178, 257 S.W.2d 922 (1953).
" A & A Checker Cab Operating Co. v. Fritzshall, - Okla. -, 264 P.2d 322
(1953). A recent New Mexico case adopts the same view. Waldroop v. Driver-Miller
Plumbing & Heating Corp., 61 N.M. 412, 301 P.2d 521 (1956). The opinion contains a
discussion of the opposing views and lists Alabama, California, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Washington as receiving the opinion based on past history. To the same effect is a Federal
District Court for Pennsylvania. Campbell v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 122 F. Supp. 749
(W.D. Pa. 1954); Danner v. Chandler, 205 Okla. 185, 236 P.2d 503 (1951).
" McCormick & Ray, op. cit. supra note 5, S 835.
"°Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 79 Tex. 468, 14 S.W. 993 (1890).
" Ibid.
aa Id. at 994.
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In Walker v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,63 the physician's testimony
of what plaintiff told him he had eaten for dinner was held ad-
missible as the basis for his opinion as to the cause of plaintiff's
illness which the doctor diagnosed as ptomaine poisoning. A patient's
statement, related by the doctor, may cover subjective as well as
objective symptoms. For example, in Norwich Union Indem. Co. v.
Smith," deceased, a painter, fell from a roof and sustained injuries
from which he died. The doctor-witness took charge several weeks af-
ter the incident had occurred and testified in this case to facts he ob-
tained from deceased to aid him in diagnosing the injury. These were
held to be admissible, the court saying: "The weight of authority
seems to be that a physician should be permitted to testify to both
the subjective as well as objective symptoms on which he bases his
professional opinion."'" Similar language was used by another court
of civil appeals in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Marsden," where
the court said:
Neither do we believe there was error in permitting Dr. 0. Lindley,
while testifying as an expert medical witness, to state the history of
the case as given to him by appellee while undergoing examination. It
is our understanding that physicians in making a diagnosis reach their
conclusions based upon two sources of information, namely, the ob-
jective and subjective symptoms. The subjective symptoms must neces-
sarily come from the patient and include in part at least some of the
history of the case.
In a more recent case the Austin Court of Civil Appeals said: "We
believe that the doctor could give his opinion as to the extent and
cause of Mrs. Burkhart's injuries, and could relate the history of
the injury given him by the patient."68 Since these statements are
not offered as evidence of the facts declared but merely as an explana-
tion of the opinion previously expressed by the doctor, they are
not hearsay and should not be subjected to the restrictions which
limit the use of hearsay declarations.
The Supreme Court of Texas has indicated by dictum that a
doctor who is called in solely for the purpose of qualifying as an
63 131 Tex. 57, 112 S.W.2d 170 (1938). The court quoted from Pullman Palace Car
Co. v. Smith, 79 Tex. 468, 14 S.W. 993 (1890).
643 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), aff'd, 12 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Comm. App.
1929).
653 S.W.2d at 121.
6 57 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 127 Tex. 84, 92
S.W.2d 237 (1936).
67 Id. at 903. More recent cases are: Ynsfran v. Burkhart, 247 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wilkerson, 199 S.W.2d 288
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.
"6Ynsfran v. Burkhart, supra note 67, at 914.
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expert witness will not be permitted to testify to statements made
to him by the claimant, even as a part of the explanation of his
opinion." This dictum creates some uncertainty, since the court
does not distinguish between the use of the statement as independent
evidence of its truth and its use in explanation of the opinion.
Many general statements may be found in court opinions to the
effect that what a patient tells a doctor with the sole view of quali-
fying him as a witness may not be received in evidence, but the
courts seldom distinguish the possible uses of such testimony."
Obviously, if the opinion of the physician called in for the express
purpose of preparing himself to testify is to be rejected merely be-
cause it is based in part on the plaintiff's statements, then there
is no opinion to explain. But if the courts would receive the opinion
of the qualifying physician in such a situation, then in accord with
the rule as to expert testimony generally, the physician should be
allowed to recite, as a part of the basis for his opinion, the statements
made to him by the plaintiff as to the history of the case. Moreover,
such an explanation appears to be necessary for the jury to weigh
the value of the opinion. If it be suggested that the jury may be in-
clined to give undue weight to statements made under these cir-
cumstances, I would answer that this danger is greatly exaggerated.
However, to guard against such a possibility the opponent is certainly
entitled to have the jury instructed not to consider the "history" as
evidence of the facts recounted. Furthermore, if the evidence of
the "history" given to the doctor by the patient-plaintiff is being
elaborated by the doctor witness for the apparent purpose of giving
independent force to these statements, the judge may, in his discre-
tion, confine the doctor to a general statement of the "history."
IV. CONCLUSION
In the course of this paper the writer has attempted to show that
the courts tend to fetter the testimony of physicians as to symptoms
and diagnostic opinions with too many restrictions. These include
the rejection of the following types of testimony: (1) statements of
the claimant as to past symptoms offered as evidence of their truth,
even when made to a treating doctor; (2) statements of the claimant
'9Walker v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 131 Tex. 57, 112 S.W.2d 170 (1938). This
is the case where the ruling admitted a statement of what plaintiff had eaten for dinner,
made when he was violently ill and seeking treatment.
"o Examples of such are found in the following cases: United Employers Cas. Co. v.
Marr, 144 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism. jud. corr.; Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen & Eng'rs v. Raney, 101 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.;
Gaines v. Stewart, 57 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
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as to the cause of injury offered as evidence of their truth, even
when made to a treating doctor; (3) statements of the claimant
made to a doctor who examines the litigant for the sole purpose of
qualifying as an expert witness when offered as independent evidence
of their truth; (4) opinion of a physician based in part on reports
of other doctors or upon hospital records disclosing the claimant's
symptoms and treatment; (5) opinion of a physician based in part
upon the history of an ailment or injury, given by a spouse or parent
of the claimant; (6) opinion of a physician who examines claimant
solely to qualify himself to testify as an expert witness, based in
part on statements of the claimant as to past symptoms; and (7)
recital as basis of opinion of statements made by claimant to doctor
who examines solely for the purpose of qualifying as an expert wit-
ness.
The distinction so often drawn today between the treating doctor
and the medical expert who examines for the purpose of qualifying
as a witness in determining the admissibility of their opinions or
statements made to them by the claimant is without support in reason
or medical experience. Furthermore, its evasion is now so common
as to demonstrate the utter futility of such a discrimination. The
exclusion of opinions of doctors based partly on hearsay has been
carried beyond all reason. If it were logically followed, no doctor's
opinion could be received, because every such opinion is honey-
combed with hearsay, including his medical studies, medical treatises,
research of others appearing in scientific and medical journals, and
reports of other doctors and nurses as well as statements of the
patient.
We should let the doctor give his testimony in the way most natur-
al for him and with the least possible interference in the form of
technical rules based upon outmoded concepts of the past. Where
statements made to him as to past history, including reports of
other doctors and hospital records and statements by the patient, are
relied upon by him in the formation of his diagnosis, they should
at least be received by the courts for consideration by the trier of
the facts. Doctors are far more experienced in these matters than
lawyers and are better judges of the reliability of such statements.
This is an area in which we might well yield to our medical brethren.
It is high time for the courts to recognize in testimonial rules the
accepted practices of the medical profession and to accord greater re-
spect to the judgments of our professional colleagues. When we do, I
am sure we fill find them ready to assume their share of the respon-
sibility to society for the just disposition of personal injury claims.
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